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NOTES
The FDA's Public Board of Inquiry and the
Aspartame Decision
The Food and Drug Administration must resolve difficult scientific and
technological questions in promulgating and administering its regulations.'
During the 1960s the FDA encountered problems with its process for resolv-
ing scientific disputes.2 Hearings were perceived to be burdensome reveal-
ing a need for a more efficient process.' The FDA has since attempted to
improve its regulatory process by adopting summary procedures4 and by
implementing new regulations to govern its rulemaking and hearing
procedures. 5 One new procedure is the public board of inquiry,' a body of
scientific experts that conducts hearings as scientific inquiries rather than
as adversarial proceedings.'
In 1980 the first public board of inquiry was convened to consider the
safety of the sugar substitute aspartame.' While the board withheld ap-
proval for aspartame,9 the FDA commissioner overturned the board's deci-
sion and gave final approval for the sugar substitute." The eight-year ap-
proval process" demonstrates the difficulty of regulatory decisionmaking
and provides a context within which to examine the utility of the new board
mechanism.
I Some of the FDA's most controversial and difficult regulation involves products that
are suspected of causing cancer. For a discussion of regulatory problems of the FDA see
generally SUBCOHM. ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND TECHNOLOGY, 96TH CONG, 2d SEss., THE FOOD
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION'S PROCESS FOR APPROVING NEW DRUGS (Comm. Print 1980)
[hereinafter cited as FDA DRUG PROCESS]; COMM. ON AGRICULTURE, NUTRITION, AND FORESTRY,
95TH CONG., 1ST SESS., FOOD SAFETY WHERE ARE WE? (Comm. Print 1979) [hereinafter cited
as FOOD SAFETY]; FoodAdditives: Competitive, Regulatory, andSafety Problems: Hearings Before
the Select Comm. on Small Business, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977) [hereinafter cited as Food
Additives].
2 See Hamilton, Rulemaking on a Record by the Food and Drug Administration, 50 TEX.
L. REV. 1132 (1972); Note, FDA Rule-Making Hearings: A Way Out of the Peanut Butter
Quagmire, 40 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 726 (1972). See infra note 17.
* See infra notes 16-30 and accompanying text.
'See infra note 22.
5 21 C.F.R. 5 12.32 (1983), authorizes parties to any proceeding subject to a formal hear-
ing to agree to a hearing before one of three alternatives: a public board of inquiry, an ad-
visory committee, or the commissioner. See R. MERRILL & P.B. HUTT, supra note 21, at 898-901.
6 21 C.F.R. § 13 (1981).
7 Id. § 13.30.
8 [1981 New Matters] FOOD DRUG CoSM. L. REP. (CCH) ([In the matter of] Aspartame) 38,124;
46 Fed. Reg. 38,285 (1981) (Commissioner's Final Decision) [Hereinafter cited as Final Deci-
sion]; [1980 New Matters] FOOD DRUG COSM. L. REP. (CCH) ([In the matter of] Aspartume)
38,072 (Board's Initial Decision) [Hereinafter cited as Initial Decision].
I Initial Decision, supra note 8, at 38,349.
10 Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,734; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285.
11 Searle petitioned the FDA in 1973 and got final approval for aspartame in 1981. Id. at
38,734-35; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285.
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The thesis of this note is that, on balance, the idea of a public board of
inquiry is sound. Nevertheless, difficulties with the aspartame decision point
to a need for procedural reform. This note suggests reform that would
enhance the utility of the board, and concludes that the role of scientific
decisionmaking bodies should be limited to clarifying areas of technical
disagreement. Final resolution of matters that touch the frontier of science
often is impossible,"2 and in the face of such uncertainty, policy determina-
tions should be for the FDA commissioner. In reaching this conclusion this
note (1) examines the background of FDA promulgation of the board pro-
cedure, (2) provides a short description of FDA approval of aspartame, and
(3) analyzes the utility of the board in light of the aspartame decision.
FDA HEARINGS AND THE PUBLIC BOARD OF INQUIRY
FDA regulations frequently address complex questions that exemplify
a basic clash between law and science. 3 Formal agency hearings have been
criticized as being an inappropriate forum for dealing with scientific issues.14
As a result, the agency has developed the public board of inquiry as an
alternative forum.' 5 This section describes the rationale underlying the
board's procedures and delineates the operative framework of the board.
Rationale For Using Board Hearings
Compliance with the minimal statutory requirement for hearings was
one reason for the FDA's promulgation of the board concept."0 Originally,
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act required a formal evidentiary
12 Cf. Jasanoff & Nelkin, Science, Technology, and the Limits of Judicial Competence, 214
Scs 1211,1214 (1981) ("Proposals-that enhance the role of scientists in adjudicatory procedures
may bring areas of technical disagreement into sharper focus, but will not necessarily lead
to resolution.").
" R. MERRILL, & P.B. HUrr, FOOD AND DRUG LAW xx (1980).
1' See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text.
21 C.F.R. S 13 (1983).
18 See Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938,21 U.S.C. S 371(e) (1976). This section
provides in pertinent part:
As soon as practicable after such request for a public hearing, the Secretary,
after due notice, shall hold such a public hearing for the purpose of receiving
evidence relevant and material to the issues raised by such objections. At the
hearing, any interested person may be heard in person or by representative.
As soon as practicable after completion of the hearing, the Secretary shall by
order act upon such objections and make such order public. Such order shall
be based only on substantial evidence of record at such hearing and shall set
forth, as part of the order, detailed findings of fact on which the order is based.
The Secretary shall specify in the order the date on which it shall take effect,
except that it shall not be made to take effect prior to the ninetieth day after
its publication unless the Secretary finds that emergency conditions exist
necessitating an earlier effective date, in which event the Secretary shall specify
in the order his findings as to such conditions.
21 U.S.C. S 371(e)(3) (1976).
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hearing for every proposed regulation, regardless of controversy." The Act
later was amended to require such a hearing only upon objection to a pro-
posed regulation and a subsequent request for a hearing. Formal hearings
are not presently held when proposals are considered by the agency; rather
they are held to resolve disputes arising from final orders. 8 The agency
uses hearings whether formal or informal, primarily to create a record for
judicial review and to give affected persons an opportunity to question the
agency's factual determinations. 9 Utilization of a board hearing thus fulfills
the statutory mandate in situations where a hearing is required, but a for-
mal hearing is inappropriate.
A second reason for promulgating the board concept was that the FDA
wanted to reduce inefficiency.' During the 1960s, the FDA conducted what
have been characterized as lengthy and inefficient hearings.2 In response
to this criticism, the agency attempted to reduce inefficiency by pioneer-
ing the use of summary procedures to deny unmerited hearings,' limiting
cross-examination to the extent permitted by the Administrative Procedure
Act,' and promulgating regulations that allow parties entitled to a formal
hearing to agree instead to an informal hearing, such as the public board.24
17 Act of Apr. 15, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-335, 68 Stat. 55; Act of Aug. 1, 1956, Pub. L. No.
84-905, 70 Stat. 919. See 40 Fed. Reg. 22,966 (1975).1' See Note, supra note 2, at 731.
" One commentator saw three possible justifications for formal evidentiary hearings, none
of which are effectively served: to develop information for making a reasonable decision, to
create a record for judicial review, and to give affected persons an opportunity to question
the agency's factual premises. Hamilton, Procedures for the Adoption of Rules of GeneralAppli-
cability: The Need for Procedural Innovation in Administrative Rulemaking, 60 CAL. L. REV.
1276, 1291-93 (1972).
See 40 Fed. Reg. 22,966-67 (1975).
Two hearings singled out were the Foodsfor Special Dietary Uses hearing, and the hearing
to decide the content of peanuts in peanut butter. The dietary foods hearing had over 200
days of testimony comprising a 32,000 page transcript, and the peanut butter hearing had
a transcript of over 7,700 pages. Hamilton, supra note 19, at 1287-88. President Carter stated
in a news conference that "[i]t should not have taken 12 years and a hearing record of over
100,000 pages for the FDA to decide what percentage of peanuts there ought to be in peanut
butter" R. MERRILL & P.B. HUTT. FOOD AND DRUG LAW 896 (1980) (quoting from 15 WEEKLY
COMP. PREs. Doc. 482, 484 (Mar. 25, 1979)). But see Dixon, Rulemaking and the Myth of Cross-
Examination, 34 AD. L. REV. 389, 420 (1982) (hearing given a "bum rap").
"See Ames & McCracken, Framing Regulatory Standards to AvoidFormal Adjudication:
The FDA As a Case Study, 64 CAL. L. REV. 14 (1976):
Recently the Food and Drug Administration has taken aggressive action to
reduce the burden of prolonged administrative hearings by initiating the use
of summary judgment, by allocating the burden of proof to drug manufacturers
in drug efficacy hearings, and by using its rulemaking authority to its full ex-
tent so as to avoid questions of fact in both agency adjudication and judicial
enforcement proceeding.
Id See also McGarity, Substantive and Procedural Discretion in Administrative Resolution
of Science Policy Questions: Regulating Carcinogens in EPA and OSHA, 67 GEo.L.J. 729 (1979).
McGarity writes that the FDA's summary judgment approach has had a mixed review in
the courts. Id. at 762-63.
R. MERRILL & P.B. HUTT, supra note 21, at 896-98.
See supra note 5.
1983]
INDIANA LA W JOURNAL
A third reason for instituting the board was the FDA's desire to use ad-
visory committees comprised of independent scientific experts to enhance
the substance, credibility, and public acceptance of agency decisions.' The
FDA also saw judicial deference to agency expertise as a mandate to in-
corporate the judgment of the country's experts into FDA regulatory
decisions."
A fourth reason for promulgating the board was that the FDA wished
to avoid misuse or abuse of formal hearings.' In its proposal of the board
process, the FDA pointed to what it thought to be unnecessary interference
by lawyers using the adversarial process, and noted that adversarial pro-
cess is not suited to deciding scientific issues.' The FDA designed the board
to exclude lawyers, or at least to make them unnecessary.9 To this end,
the regulations provide that the board is to investigate complex scientific
and medical issues through scientific inquiry, not adversarial proceedings.'
FRAMEWORK OF THE BOARD
Board Formation
An FDA commissioner may set up a board under three conditions:
(1)when the commissioner decides that a board decision on any matter before
the FDA would be in the public interest; (2)when a section of FDA regula-
tions provide for convening a board; or (3) when a party who has a right
to a formal hearing requests a board in its place. 1 The commissioner then
11 Hutt, Unresolved Issues in the Conflict Between Individual Freedom and Government Control
of Food Safety in FOOD SAFETY, supra note 1, at 292, 312.
Hutt, Views on Supreme CourtlFDA Decisions, 28 FOOD DRUG Cosm L.J. 662,667 (1973).
40 Fed. Reg. 22,967 (1975).
Then Chief Counsel to the FDA, Peter Hutt, commented that administrative proceedings
utilizing cross-examination accomplished little: "It has, of course, done one thing. It has
employed hundreds of lawyers involved in these proceedings. But instead of advancing the
scientific issue or the regulatory issue or whatever is involved, I would argue that it has
set us back." Hutt, Impact of Recent Court Decisions on the Future of FDA Regulations: An
Impromptu Response to the Remarks of the Speakers, 28 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 707,714 (1973).
The introduction to the informal hearing proposal quoted Professor Gellhorn as comment-
ing that "some of this country's gravest administrative deficiencies stem from lawyer-induced
overreliance on courtroom methods to cope with problems for which they are unsuited." 40
Fed. Reg. 22,974 (1975). Thus, the regulation proposal suggested:
[I]t is anticipated that there will be little, if any, need for participation by
attorneys in the proceedings. The Participants will primarily be the scientists
and others with technical backrounds who wish to present data and informa-
tion relevant to issues raised at the hearing.
Id.
40 Fed. Reg. 22,974 (1975).
21 C.F.R. S 13.30 (1983).
3 Id. S 13.1. One writer warns of the possibly erratic and arbitrary application of the first
condition. Thompson, -Public Hearings-A ViewFrom the Bar, 32 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 312,
313-14 (1977).
[Vol. 58:627
ASPAR TAME DECISION
chooses three board members from confidential lists of nominees.' One list
is submitted by the director of the FDA bureau responsible for the matter
before the board,' while another list is submitted by any person whose
petition was granted and is the subject of the hearing.- From these lists
the first member of the board is chosen. 5 The second member is chosen
from lists submitted by other parties,' and the third member, who becomes
the chairman, is chosen by the commissioner from any source 7 Each list
contains nominations of five persons who are to have relevant medical,
technical, scientific, or other qualifications." Each nominee is to be aware
of the nomination, willing to become a member," and free from conflict of
interest, bias, or prejudice concerning the issues.0 The commissioner may
request additional information about nominees or require additional nomina-
tions if he is unable to find a nominee who does not have a conflict of
interest."' The parties to the proceedings may agree to modify the selec-
tion process, increase the number of board members, or designate one of
the FDA's standing committees as a board for purposes of the proceeding.4"
Fact Finding in Board Hearings
Before notice of hearing is published, the responsible bureau must sub-
mit to the Docket Management Branch the following: the relevant ad-
ministrative records; a list of persons whose views are to be presented orally
or in writing at the hearing; all relevant documents, except work product,
in the bureau director's files, whether favorable or unfavorable to the direc-
tor's position; all other documents to be relied upon; and a statement signed
by the director affirming compliance with procedure."3 Within the time
prescribed by the notice of hearing, participants are required to submit
items similar to the latter four items listed above,' and must exercise
"reasonable diligence" in identifying the relevant documents comparable
to the bureau's documents. 5 Failure to comply in good faith constitutes
waiver of the right to a hearing.6 Supplemental materials may be presented
- 21 C.F.R. § 13.10(c) (1983).
" See id.
3Id.
5Id.
" Id-
7 Id.Id. 13.10(a).
Id. 13.10(b).
' Id. 13.10(a).
Id. 13.10c)(2).Id. 13.10(d).
13 Id. 13.25(a).
11 Id. 13.25(b).
45 Id.
"6 Id. 13.25(d).
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only upon a showing that the supplemental information was not known or
reasonably available, or that need for the information could not reasonably
have been foreseen.
The board hearing is conducted as a scientific inquiry rather than as a
trial.48 Oral presentations may be made at the hearing, but other parties
or participants may not interrupt Cross-examination is limited, but board
members may ask questions,51 parties may comment on presentation, par-
ties may ask the board to ask further questions,52 and the board may allow
any participant to ask questions if the chairman determines that those ques-
tions would be helpful in resolving the issues.0 The hearing is to be
informal,' with the rules of evidence not applicable.5 However, while
evidence may not be objected to as inadmissible its admissibility may be
commented upon.' Finally, the board may consult with anyone, providing
it does so at an announced meeting.57
THE ASPARTAME HEARING
The aspartame approval process is a classic case history of regulatory
decisionmaking which involves difficult scientific questions. Many elements
associated with such a decision are present: a drug manufacturer whose
experience with regulation has been long, difficult, and expensive, and
whose clinical methods are clouded by suspicion;' a consumer group joined
by a former Nader associate intervening to protect the public;" a scientist
who has criticized the agency for years;' a commissioner with definite ideas
about regulation;6' and a controversial topic- a sugar substitute suspected
of being unsafe.2 This section describes the background of the aspartame
decision, the nature of the product, the safety issues, and how the data were
analyzed by the board and the commissioner.
"7 Id. S 13.25(c).
" Id. 5 13.30(a).
" Id. 5 13.30(c).
' See id. S 13.30(c)-(f)(1).
51 Id. § 13.30(c).
5 Id.
5 Id.
Id. S 13.30(d).
5Id.
5 Id.
5' Id. S 13.30(f)(1).
See infra note 72.
5 See infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
See infra note 70 and accompanying text.
" See e.g., infra notes 169-78 and accompanying text. See also New Commissioner Finds
No Lack of Challenges-Or Satisfaction, FDA CONS.. Nov. 1981, at 16; Hayes Intends Modest
Reforms at FDA, 213 Sci. 984 (1981).
" See infra notes 77-100 and accompanying text.
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The Product
Saccharin manufacturers held a virtual monopoly on the United States
low calorie sweetener market from the 1969 ban on cyclamate' until G.D.
Searle and Company received approval in 1981 for aspartame,64 a nutritive
sweetener comprised of two amino acids. With aspartame approval for use
in soft drinks, -  the value of Searle's share of the artificial sweetener market
could amount to a billion dollars by the mid-1980s.68 Although not as sweet
as saccharin, aspartame's advantages, so Searle advertises, are not having
saccharin's bitter aftertaste and having a complete and public safety
record."
Approval Process
In 1973, Searle petitioned the FDA for approval of aspartame,68 and
received approval the following year.' However, Dr. John Olney, a
psychiatrist at Washington University of St. Louis and longtime critic of
the FDA's monosodium glutamate policy, 0 together with James S. Turner,
author of The Chemical Feast7 and co-founder of the Center for Study of
Responsive Law (Nader Research Group), and LABEL (Legal Action for
Buyer's Education and Labeling), a consumer organization concerned about
chemicals in foods, raised questions concerning the safety of the product,
' N.Y. Times, July 16, 1981, at 16, col. 1. The FDA concluded that cyclamate compounds
are not useful for obese or diabetic persons and completely removed cyclamate from the
market. 35 Fed. Reg. 13,644 (1969). Cyclamate manufacturers have petitioned FDA for recon-
sideration. 47 Fed. Reg. 51,227 (1982).
Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,734; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285.
The aspartame regulation was amended in the summer of 1983 to allow for the use of
aspartame in soft drinks. 48 Fed. Reg. 31,376 (1983). Originally aspartame was approved only
for fable top use. 21 C.F.R. § 172,804 (1981). On August 17, 1983 the Coca-Cola Company
announced beginning distribution of Diet Coke sweetened with aspartame, with nationwide
distribution projected by the end of the year. N.Y. Times, Aug. 18, 1983, at 30 col. 5.
See infra note 72.
8 FDA Approves Sweetener with High Perceived Sweetness, FOOD PROCESSING, Sept. 1981,
at 36; Approved by FDA, Aspartame Debuts as Low-Calorie Sweetener, FOOD DEVELOPMENT.
Aug., 1981, at 44.
38 Fed. Reg. 5921 (1973).
39 Fed. Reg. 27,317; correction notice, 39 Fed. Reg. 34,520 (1974); codified at 21 C.F.R.
172,804 (1974).
70 See J. VERRETT & J. CARPER, EATING MAY BE HAZARDOUS TO YOUR HEALTH 88-97 (1974)
for a history of Olney's dispute with the FDA over monosodium glutamate. For a different
opinion of Olney see Labuza, The Risks and Benefits of Food Supply in FOOD SAFETY, supra
note 1, at 323, 331. Labuza complied a "Ted's Terrible Ten" list of persons who have "led
to mass confusion and distrust of our food supply." Olney was on the list because he "mis-
used scientific design of toxicological experiments to cause millions of mothers to worry about
brain damage to their children from MSG."
71 J. TURNER, THE CHEMICAL FEAST (1970) (Nader study group report of food protection and
the FDA).
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necessitating an FDA hearing.72 The parties waived their right to a full
evidentiary hearing in exchange for a hearing before a public board of
inquiry.' Lists of nominees were submitted by Olney, Searle, and the
Bureau of Foods.74 The acting commissioner selected a panel,75 and in the
summer of 1979 the FDA announced establishment of the aspartame board."
Issues before the board were:
1. ***whether the ingestion of aspartame, whether alone or together
with glutamate, poses a risk of contributing to mental retardation, brain
damage, or undesirable effects on neuroendocrine regulatory
systems***
2. ***whether the ingestion of aspartame may induce brain
neoplasms (tumors) in the rat***
Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,735; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285. Dr. James Olney, see supra
note 70 and accompanying text, had challenged the safety of aspartame arguing that it could
be dangerous to persons suffering from phenylketonuria (PKU), a genetic disorder that
prevents metabolism of phenylalamine, one of the amino acids found in aspartame. Later
Olney charged that aspartic acid, aspartame's other amino acid component, is a possible source
of brain damage, and that aspartame might cause cancer.Aspartame Approved Despite Risks,
213 Sci. 986, 986-87 (1981) [Hereinafter cited as FDA Approval].
Before these allegations could be contested at a hearing, however, an FDA audit of Searle
clinical methods revealed "sloppy" research which included the research done on aspartame.
These new revelations lowered company morale and badly shook investor confidence in the
drug manufacturer. Wall St. J., July 21, 1975, at 4, col. 3. Dr. Alexander Schmidt, then FDA
Commissioner, noted that the FDA had:
"found different discrepancies of different kinds. Some favored the product
(Aspartame) and some [did not]." In some cases, the numbers in animal-test results
didn't add up correctly .... In some other cases, the agency had questions over
the animal-testing plan itself, and in other circumstances ... pathologists ...
had differing interpretations of animal data.
Id., Dec. 5, 1975, at 8, col. 3.
By 1976 Searle had $29 million of unrecoverable investment in the sweetener. Id., Apr.
26, 1976, at 30, col. 2..A stay on the aspartame regulation was issued. 40 Fed. Reg. 56,907
(1975). Searle halted production at its Augusta, Georgia aspartame plant and suspended a
joint effort with General Foods Corporation to chart possible large scale marketing of aspar-
tame. Wall St. J., Dec. 14, 1978, at 15, col. 1. The FDA called for a grand jury investigation,
id., Apr. 9, 1976, at 30, col. 2, and a study by an independent group of pathologists, Univer-
sities Associated for Research and Education in pathology (UAREP). Final decision, supra
note 8, at 38,736; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285-86; Food Additives, supra note 1, at 10-13,28-31, 114-19,
432-39. The UAREP study took two years to complete, and approved the Searle studies as
"authentic," but the FDA refused to grant aspartame approval. Id., May 8, 1979, at 21, col.
2. The delay was costly to Searle. Id. Speculation that Canada might approve the sweetener,
though, sparked investor confidence in Searle. Searle's stock recommendation changed from
a "sell-hold" to "buy" position. Id., Mar. 6, 1979, at 39, col. 1. Searle also began to get soft
drink manufacturers interested because Searle scientists were encouraged about aspartame's
adaptability for use in soft drinks. Id.
11 40 Fed. Reg. 56,907 (1975).
7' Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,736; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,286.
71 Id. The board members were: Walle J.H. Nauta, M.D., Ph.D, Institute Professor, Depart-
ment of Psychology and Brain Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; Peter J.
Lampert, M.D., Professor and Chairman, Department of Pathology, University of California
(San Diego); and Vernon R. Young, Ph.D. Professor of Nutritional Biochemistry, Department
of Nutrition and Food Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Dr. Nauta was the
chairman. Id.
71 44 Fed. Reg. 31,716 (1979).
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3. Based on answers to the above questions,
(a) Should aspartame be allowed for use in foods, or instead should
approval of aspartame be withdrawn?
(b) If aspartame is allowed for use in foods, i.e., if its approval is
not withdrawn what conditions of use and labeling and label statements
should be required, if any?"'
The board's decision was specified in the notice to become final unless the
parties filed exceptions. 8 If exceptions were filed, the commissioner was
to review the decision and make his own determinations.
79
The board met on January 30, 31, and February 1, 1980.'o On the first
issue it found that aspartame did not pose an increased risk of brain or
endocrine dysfunction;8 however, on the second issue the board ruled that
aspartame might cause cancer.82 The board then vacated the stay on the
aspartame regulation and revoked the regulation, concluding that aspar-
tame should not be marketed until further safety testing.' All parties filed
exceptions." In a July 18, 1981 decision, the commissioner overruled the
portions of the board's ruling finding aspartame unsafe,5 dismissed Turner's
objections concerning the scope of evidence considered by the board," and
approved the regulation allowing marketing of aspartame for certain
tabletop usesY
Data Analysis
The board and the commissioner only differed significantly on the
evidence pertaining to carcinogenicity.' The board noted that its considera-
tion was limited by necessity to three studies dealing with aspartame's pro-
pensity to cause tumor formation because these were the only studies on
" Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,736; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,286.
" 44 Fed. Reg. 31,716, 31,718 (1979).
7 Id.
so Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,737; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,286.
81 Initial Decision, supra note 8, at 38,346.
Id. at 38,349.
8 Id.
U Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,737; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,286.
" Id. at 38,734; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285. After the board issued its decision against aspartame
approval, Searle issued press releases contesting the board's determinations. [1980 New Mat-
ters] FOOD DRUG Cosms L. REP. (CCII) 40,789. Searle stepped up pressure on the FDA in the
summer of 1981 by threatening to press a lawsuit filed earlier in an attempt to force a final
decision. In this way Searle's lawyers forced an agreement for a final decision by July 15,
1981. Wall St. J., July 16,1981, at 2, col. 2. Added pressure was exerted on the commissioner
because of a possible ban on saccharin and the 1980 decision not to reinstate approval for
cyclamate. Cyclamate (Cyclamic Acid, Calcium Cyclamate and Sodium Cyclamate) Commis-
sioner's Decision, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,474 (1980).
Id. at 38,764-66; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,301-02.
87 Id. at 38,767-68; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,303. After reading the commissioner's decision, two
board members unofficially reversed their opinions, convinced by his rebuttal. FDA Approval,
supra note 72.
U Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,752-64; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,294-301.
19831
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the question reported by Searle. 9 Two of the studies troubled the board.
The first was disturbing because of a high rate of death of young test rats
and a possible dose-effect relationship that indicated aspartame might cause
cancer.0 The second study was found "puzzling" because it used an insuffi-
cient number of experimental animals, and "bizarre" because the control
group had a higher incidence of brain tumors than the board thought
normal.91 The board thus found it difficult or even impossible to judge aspar-
tame's possible oncogenity on the basis of the Searle data. 2 Although the
board concluded that the study results may have been misleading because
the test animals were fed enough aspartame to cause amino acid imbalance,
it decided that on the record before it an oncogenic effect from aspartame
could not be ruled out.93
The commissioner in turn, found error in the way the board evaluated
the data for the two disputed studies.9 In the first study he found that the
board had done an improper statistical analysis,95 and had made factual er-
rors in noting age at death for certain rats.' When these errors were cor-
rected, the study was found not to indicate carcinogenicity.97 In the second
study, the commissioner found that the board had set the normal rate of
tumor incidence much too low,99 and thus dismissed concern over the study
size after Searle had demonstrated that its study was comparable to the
bureau's standard.9 The commissioner noted that added support for his
decision came from a study by Ajinomoto affirming aspartame's safety. The
Ajinomoto study had been released after the board had published its deci-
sion, but the commissioner justified including this study for consideration
by noting that the proceeding was intended to be a scientific inquiry using
all available evidence.'
PROPOSALS FOR IMPROVING THE BOARD PROCEDURE
The aspartame decision illustrates that the board can contribute to the
regulatory process. The board was successful in crystalizing and narrow-
ing the issues' and brought independent expert assessment into the deci-
'7 Initial Decision, supra note 8, at 38,346.
90 Id. at 38,347.
11 Id. at 38,348.
92Id.
93 Id. at 38,348-49.
, Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,752-64; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,294-301.
Id. at 38,761; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,299-300.
Id. at 38,761-62; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,300.
' Id. at 38,764; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,301.
98 Id. at 38,758; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,298.
Id. at 38,762-63; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,300.
Id. at 38,753-54; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,295.
191 For example, the commissioner was able to focus on the carcinogenicity data in his evalua-
tion, see Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,752-64; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,294-301.
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sionmaking process."' It provided a forum for interested groups and in-
dividuals to criticize the FDA's determinations,"' and generated a record
for judicial review."4 The board's procedure forced the commissioner to
make public his position on regulatory matters and to explain how he ar-
rived at his conclusions." 5 Actual hearing time was of acceptable length,
three days out of an eight-year process.1 "
Both in areas of agreement and disagreement, the board and the com-
missioner evaluated the data differently. Some differences were trivial;
others were major.,107 The differences may be explained in terms of a com-
bination of unrefined board procedures and more general difficulties faced
by scientific decisionmaking bodies. The remaining sections of this note
examine reasons for the differences in the decisions, and suggest proposals
designed to improve the decisionmaking of the board.
Scientific Uncertainty
Part of the discrepancy between the decisions of the board and the com-
missioner may be attributed to scientific uncertainty for the following two
reasons.
102 21 O.F.R. § 13.10(a) (1981). The members of the board are not to be full or part-time
employees of the FDA unless all parties agree to an exception. See supra note 75, for the
names of the board members in the aspartame hearing.
103 See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
104 See Final Decision, supra note 8.
105 See id. Throughout his opinion the commissioner answered exceptions to the board's
decision filed by the parties.
" Searle filed its petition for aspartame approval in 1973 and received final approval in
1981. Id. at 38,734-35; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,285. The hearings were held on January 30, 31, and
February 1, 1980. Id. 38,737; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,286. Perhaps the fact that the time required
for the board hearing comprised only a small proportion of the approval process suggests
that a review of the entire decisionmaking process would be productive. One commentator
has noted that:
Stress on the purely technical aspects of the decision may not be well founded
since the real issues tend to be those of a social nature. A more formal view
of the entire process, the decision-making process, seems to be warranted so
that the relative importance of the technical versus social aspects in making
a decision can be properly assayed.
Talbott, "Science Court". A Possible Way to Obtain Scientific Certainty for Decisions Based
on Scientific "Fact"?, 8 ENVTL. L. 827,850 (1978). See Ramo, TheRegulation of Technological
Activities:A New Approach, 67 A.B.A. L.J. 1456,1461-62 (1980), where a "technological F.B.I."
is proposed as a more satisfactory system for resolving regulation of technological activities.
Ramo argues that the current regulatory process for technology based problems needs reform
as a whole.
The proposal for a National Science Panel, see infra note 117, has recently taken more con-
crete shape in the National Science Act, Hearings Before the Subcomm. onDepartment Opera-
tions, Research, and Foreign Agriculture, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981).
"0 An example of a minor difference in interpreting data is the way the board and the
commissioner treated a benchmark set by the board for comparison purposes on the PKU
issue. The board used a 4 ounce hamburger as the benchmark for comparison of amounts
of phenylalanine intake, but failed to take account of the fact that people actually eat cooked
hamburgers. The commissioner made the adjustment, noting that the "change in no way af-
fects the validity of the board's conclusions." Id. at 38,745 n.17; 46 Fed. Reg. at 38,290 n.17.
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First, uncertainties generated by science and technology are approached
differently by law and by science."' The law must resolve questions inex-
pensively and quickly, against the background of complex, moral, economic,
legal, and political considerations." 9 Scientists need only note uncertainty
and the need for research."0 Despite differences in approach, law and science
must work together in order for the legal system to make order out of the
problems introduced by science and technology. Science courts,"' science
clerks,' advisory committees,"' and special conferences.. are a few of the
solutions that have been suggested as a way to improve decisionmaking
on technical matters. When a science advisor or advisory group is establish-
ed, a concern is that power is being given to an elite group, unaccountable
for its actions."' To prevent power drifting to a scientific elite, attempts
are often made to separate questions of policy and fact."' In the science
court model, the science court makes factual determinations while the
primary decisionmaker -a court, legislature, or agency -takes the factual
determinations and applies societal values in making the final policy
decision."7
However, facts and values often cannot be easily separated. An inter-
twining of fact and value frequently occurs when attempts are made to
I" See generally SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY. AND NATIONAL POLICY (T. Kuehn & A. Porter eds.
1981); SCIENTISTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM: TOLERATED MEDDLERS OR ESSENTIAL CONTRIBUTORS?
(W. Thomas ed. 1974); McGarity, supra note 22.
I09 The saccharin controversy is an example of the complexity the law must take into ac-
count. See, e.g., Saccharin Ban and Food Safety Policy, 1979: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Health and Scientific Research, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. (1979); THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF HEALTH
AND SAFETY REGULATION 115-70 (R. Crandall & L. Lave eds. 1981) (case study of saccharin
regulation).
10 Loevinger, Jurimetrics: Science In Law in SCIENTISTS IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 7, 10-11 (W.
Thomas ed. 1974).
. See Martin, The Proposed "Science Court," 75 MICH. L. REV. 1058 (1977); Kantrowitz, Con-
trolling Technology Democratically, 63 AMERICAN SCIENTIST 505 (1975).
"' See Jasanoff & Nelkin, supra note 12, at 1214.
11 See id.
' See M. WESSEL, SCIENCE AND CONSCIENCE 141-83 (1980); Dworkin, Science, Society, and the
Expert Town Meeting: Some Comments on Asilomar, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 1471 (1978).
11' The fear is of technocracy. One extreme view is quoted by Lakoff: "[W]e face the real
danger of a layered society in which a scientist elite fraction floats on top and dominates
our policy-making. The danger is that a new priesthood of scientists may usurp the tradi-
tional roles of democratic decision making." Lakoff, Scientists, Technologists, and Political
Power in SCIENCE. TECHNOLOGY AND SOCIETY 355,367 (I. Spigel-R6sing & de Solla Price eds. 1977)
(quoting R. LAPP, THE NEW PRIESTHOOD: THE SCIENTIFIC ELITE AND USES OF POWER 3 (1963)).
The more realistic view, though, is expressed by Lakoff:
Scientists and technologists are likely to have a significant impact in shaping
the views of those who make decisions; but except in rare cases, where the matter
at issue is entirely or almost entirely a matter scientific judgment, the views
of scientists are not likely to determine the outcome exclusively.
Id. at 383.
... See, e.g. Kantrowitz, The Science Court Experiment, 13 TRIAL Mar. 1977, at 48.
"I Id.; see also Comparative Risk Assessment: Hearings on HR. 4939 Before the Subcomm.
on Science, Research and Technology, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 279, 281 (1980) (American Industrial
Health Council proposal for a science panel).
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resolve issues on the border of scientific knowledge.118 Much may depend
on scientific judgment. Differing scientific interpretations revolve around
how much weight is given to different parts of available data, what assump-
tions are made when data are not available, which methodologies are
credited, and what current scientific paradigms dictate.119 When scientists
are unable to explain objectively their interpretations of data, their own
biases may influence their determinations.20
The FDA has recognized the limited role of scientific decisionmakers
when uncertainties are involved. 2' However, the FDA did not attempt to
prevent consideration of value questions by the public board of inquiry in
the aspartame decision." The board was required to make the legal deter-
mination of whether aspartame should be approved for marketing instead
of solely deciding to what extent, if any, aspartame is harmful.' Although
one fear of using scientific decisionmaking bodies has been that their deci-
sions will be given too much weightu the commissioner in the aspartame
,,8 See Gillespie, Eva & Johnston, Carcinogenic Risk Assessment in the United States and
Great Britain: The Case ofAldrin/Dieldrin, 9 Sod. STUD. OF SCI. 265, 295 (1979) (fact-value
distinction of trivial value in analyzing decisions or roles of science advisors)[hereinafter cited
as Gillespie].
"I See McGarity, supra note 18, at 741-42 ("[Allthough scientists are not immune from public
policy preferences when they advise policymakers, scientific judgment has more to do with
scientist's views, arising out of long years of study, on how things operate in the physical
world with which they are familiar. As a result different scientists interpret the same data
differently."). Cf. Gillespie, supra note 118, at 278-79 (differences in social values of advisors
linked to character of science forming basis of their advice).
,1 One study relating the type of occupational control over scientists to the type of
knowledge they produce found that scientists "not only evaluated the same data differently,
and derived contrary policy implications from the same, or similar evidence, but that also,
motivated by different social and scientific commitments, they were predisposed to produce
different 'facts'." Gillespie, supra note 118, at 276 (citing Johnston & Robbins, The Develop-
ment of Specialities in Industrialised Science, 25 Soc. REV. 87 (1977); Robbins & Johnston, The
Role of Cognitive and Occupational Differentiation in Scientific Controversies, 6 Soc. STUD. OF
Sci. 349 (1976)).
" See Hutt, A Regulator's Vieupoint in NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES. How SAFE IS SAFE?
THE DESIGN OF POLICY ON DRUGS AND FOOD ADDITIVES 123 (1974):
In short, the significance of much of the animal testing conducted today is
poorly understood, and the widely variable results obtained are subject to dif-
fering interpretations. Its usefulness in the design and execution of sound public
policy under these circumstances is unfortunately limited. As a matter of prac-
tical necessity, therefore, we often regulate more out of fear of the unknown
than out of respect and appreciation of the known. And until science begins to
bring greater understanding to safety testing, regulation of the safety of food
and drugs must be accomplished in the midst of unresolvable scientific
disagreement.
'= See sup'ra text accompanying note 77. Question 3(a) involves a value judgment.
123 Id.
," David Bazelon, Chief Judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals, in critcism
of the Science Court proposal, has warned that lengthy adversarial proceedings may exag-
gerate the importance of scientific issues and minimize the underlying value choices: "A fac-
tual decision by a Science Court, surrounded by all the mystique of both science and the law,
might well have enormous, and unwarranted, political impact." Bazelon, Coping With Technology
Through the Legal Process, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 817,827 (1977); See also Talbott, supra note 106,
at 850.
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case had no difficulty challenging the board's fact or policy determinations."
The commissioner's action lessens apprehension that a board's determina-
tions might co-opt the regulator's responsibility for policy,12 and is, in
fact, a positive sign that a commissioner will not be intimidated by a board's
factual determinations. The policy question, however, should never have
been put to the board. The purpose of scientific decisionmaking by special
bodies should be to make factual, rather than policy, determinations since
this would confine the decisionmaking of these bodies to the area of their
expertise.
A second reason why scientific uncertainty may have contributed to dif-
ferences in the decisions of the board and the commissioner arises from
the difficulty of getting appropriate and trustworthy information. Often
information used to make decisions is not designed for giving answers to
issues needing resolution." For example, in the aspartame decision the in-
formation regarding background rates of brain tumors had to be ex-
trapolated from studies done for other purposes.2 ' In addition, available
information often is limited. The aspartame board had only three studies
on which to base its decision regarding carcinogenicity of aspartame."x
Finally, scientific knowledge is in constant flux. In the aspartame decision,
evidence pointing to the possible neurotoxicity of aspartame was developed
only after the original objections were filed. 3 ' In the only other matter to
date to go before a board,' additional submissions of data were solicited
because the board thought that the state of knowledge had changed since
data were submitted two years earlier."'
An imperfect solution to this problem is to have scientific decisionmak-
ing bodies such as the board define the level of uncertainty in knowledge
on a particular question. The regulator can then apply that definition as
a factor in making the final decision on a regulatory matter." The board
attempted to do this in the aspartame decision by mentioning that it thought
the significance of the carcinogenicity studies was difficult or even impossi-
ble to evaluate3 4 and by stating that further studies would be necessary."
The board also suggested factors to look for in any further studies.3 ' In-
stead of applying this determination, however, the commissioner decided
the board's concerns were unmerited.37
"2' See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
'2 See Bazelon, supra note 124.
12 See Initial Decision, supra note 8, at 38,347.
128 Id.
11 Id. at 38,346.
Id. at 38,345.
' 44 Fed. Reg. 44,274 (1979).
'2 47 Fed. Reg. 346-47(1982).
" See Kantrowitz, supra note 116, at 49-50 (science court function restricted to describing
in scientific terms exact shade of grey present).
13 Initial Decision, supra note 8, at 38,348.
" Id. at 38,348-49.
136 Id.
"I Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,752-64; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,294-301.
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Trial Type Procedures
A hotly disputed issue in the board concept is whether the use of "scien-
tific inquiry" in place of adversarial procedures is beneficial.138 For exam-
ple, the value of restrictions on cross-examination is disputed.13 In propos-
ing the board, the FDA argued that issues before the FDA in public hear-
ings were unsuited to adversarial procedures. " However, some commen-
tators, notably trial lawyers, dispute whether scientific issues of fact are
different from other issues of fact, and contend that trial-type procedures,
although not perfect, are the best way to develop facts.'
When deciding what procedures are appropriate a balance must be struck
between the various competing interests: fairness to the parties, the truth
finding function, and the need for efficiency. The board presently uses a
modified cross-examination format in which opposing parties may ask ques-
tions through the board only if the chairman decides that the questions
will be useful.' The procedure will vary with the peculiarities of any par-
ticular board.' In order to insure more accurate fact finding, the ability
of opposing parties to cross-examine witnesses should be strengthened,
while the board's consideration should be limited to factual questions."'
11 Compare Thompson, supra note 31, at 315 (removing adversary procedure "misguided
and unlikely to succeed in the long run"), Hagan, Remarks on the Regulatory Philosophy of
FDA, 28 FOOD DRUG Cosm. L.J. 195,199 (1973) (expert witness must be cross-examined in order
to discover whether substantial evidence test is met), and Kennedy, The New Vogue in Rulemak-
ing at FDA: A Foreword, 28 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 172,173 (1973) (author agrees with alarm
expressed at suggestion that trial-type procedures in hearings on scientific and technical mat-
ters are useless) with Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation Under the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic
Act, 28 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 177,187-88 (1973) (trial-type procedure inappropriate in hearings
primarily scientific or technical in nature) and Hoffman, The FDA's New Forms of Public
Hearing-Choosing Among the Alternatives, 32 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 330,336 (1977) (dismissing
lack of cross-examination as a concern saying it is available, but just carefully not labeled
as such). See also Morning Question and Answer Session, 1973 Court Cases Involving Rule-
Making Implications for Federal Regulations-Morning Session, 28 FOOD DRUG CosM. L.J. 718,
727 (1973), where Hoffman in discussing the over-the-counter drug review process says the
FDA cannot "dispense with cross-examination in all circumstances on all aspects of all issues
that arise ... just because not all of us lawyers can understand what all of those doctors
are talking about." See also Yellin, High Technology and the Courts: Nuclear Power and the
Needfor Institutional Reform, 94 HARv. L. REV. 489, 507-08 (1981) (adversarial techniques in-
appropriate in nuclear power decisionmaking context); McGarity, supra note 22, at 750 (courts
should not insist on use of formal procedures by administrative agencies); Note, supra note
2, at 738 ("Trial methods should be avoided in rule-making proceedings."). Cf. Hutt, supra
note 28, at 714 (key not cross-examination, but right to full participation).
13 See supra note 138.
Hutt, Philosophy of Regulation, supra note 138, at 187-88.
"4 See, e.g. Hagan, supra note 138, at 199.
12 See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
13 The opportunity to conform procedures to the needs of a particular controversy might
be a great advantage in the use of the board. In the depo-provera hearing, the board held
a pre-hearing conference in order to establish the methods and procedures to be used in
developing evidence at the hearing, the sequence of presentations, the amount of time allotted
to speakers, when and how questions by participants were to be permitted, and whether
summations would be allowed. 47 Fed. Reg. 36,470 (1982).
'" See Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1168. Although generally critical of cross-examination
in rulemaking proceedings, Hamilton notes that "when the'issue is clearly defined and relates
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A suggested format is to allow, cross-examination, but to give the board
authority to exclude irrelevant, immaterial, or cumulative testimony. Par-
ties would be grouped by economic interest absent a showing that such
a grouping would be prejudicial. A lead attorney chosen by each group
would do any cross-examination and reasonable time limits would be
imposed.145 Such a format might have been helpful for all sides in the aspar-
tame hearing. Searle and the Bureau of Foods might have been able to cross-
examine Olney's witnesses to show weakness in their statistical methods,'
whereas Turner might have been able to expose weakness in the Searle
studies.147
The board was designed to be an informal decisionmaking body. However,
adding the procedures suggested above would formalize the proceeding.
Yet simply because members of the board are scientists and not lawyers
does not mean that the proceeding itself should be less formal. It has been
argued that'scientists need informal procedures because, while they may
be familiar with scientific inquiry, they will be unable to control an adver-
sarial process. One commentator has noted that the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission uses tribunals similar to the board and that, although not
models of elevated scientific discourse, they use "usual adjudicatory pro-
cedures" that have proved valuable where the triers of fact are scientific
experts.'
The same commentators that question the efficacy of limiting cross-
examination also fault the board procedure for lack of discovery devices.'49
The only fact generating provision in the board regulations is that parties
use "good faith" and exercise reasonable diligence in turning over both
favorable and unfavorable data.' Reality suggests that not all parties
necessarily have the same concept of good faith and that lack of good faith
is difficult to prove. The FDA should adopt more liberal discovery provi-
sions, since permitting discovery would aid in revealing potential harms."'
In the aspartame hearing, discovery might have allowed Olney and Turner
to gather information that would support their contentions that the Searle
to specific facts rather than to general economic judgments, cross-examination has usually
been helpful."
15 The format proposed is basically the same as the one proposed by Hamilton for cross-
examination in formal FDA hearings. Id. at 1168-69. The current board procedure is less restric-
tive than the limited cross-examination regulations for formal FDA hearings. Section 12.87
allows oral cross-examination only upon a showing of the need for the procedure and a showing
that prejudice would result by denial of the request. 21 C.F.R. § 12.87 (1981).
"' See Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,760-61; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,298-99 (statistical analyses
discussed).
147 See id. at 38,764-66; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,301-02 (Turner's exceptions discussed).
148 Hoffman, supra note 138, at 336-37.
141 See supra note 138.
170 21 C.F.R. S 13.25 (1981).
... See Thompson, supra note 31, at 320. See also Koch, Discovery in Rulemaking, 1977 DUKE
L.J. 295, 345 ("The investigative nature of rulemaking dictates that any improvement in the
information gathering process will enhance the policy decision expressed in the rule.").
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studies had been poorly conducted. 2 Such information would have aided
them in presenting their case to the board. Discovery, however, has the
potential for abuse by parties. If discovery is implemented, it will have to
be carefully structured for legitimate use, and not for delay or harassment.".
. Under the present procedures, if a party determines that discovery or
cross-examination is necessary to support his case, that party may desire
to utilize a full evidentiary hearing." With this practical consideration in
" See Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,764-66; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,301-02.
" See Koch, supra note 152, at 345. In his conclusion Koch summarizes some of the dangers
and the productive uses of discovery in rulemaking:
The nature of the rulemaking process may affect the application of traditional
discovery devices. Prehearing conferences can solve many of the problems in-
herent in the movement to engraft some trial procedures onto the rulemaking
process. Compulsory process may enhance the opportunity to participate by per-
mitting the accumulation of information favorable to an interest and by foster-
ing the confrontation of adverse information. But the broad scope of many
rulemaking efforts compels substantial control of compulsory process with
respect to private information. Little control, however, need be imposed on the
opportunity to obtain documentary information in government files. Here the
Freedom of Information Act becomes an essential tool to anyone participating
in an informal agency proceeding. The traditional discovery device of written
interrogatories meshes well with notice and comment rulemaking because it
offers the opportunity for interested persons to rebut or bolster information
in written form and diminishes the need for the testimonial devices normally
used at trial. Other traditional devices, such as depositions and admissions, do
not appear generally appropriate to rulemaking but in rare situations may also
enhance the information gathering process. And no discovery system is com-
plete without some devices in the nature of protective orders for maintaining
the confidentiality of information.
Complementary to a discovery system is a strict requirement of agency
disclosure of the information on which its proposed rule has been based and
which may be used to reach a final regulatory determination. The notion of ade-
quate notice should be interpreted as requiring the agency to disclose and make
readily accessible all the information it has relative to the rule. Complemen-
ting this full notice could be a requirement that the agency or its investigative
staff publish with the proposed rule a preliminary "statement of basis and
purpose."
Discovery and disclosure thus become not only matters of fairness but means
by which the agency can attract more information and purify that which it at-
tracts. In sum, adequate access to information is an important element in fair
and efficacious rulemaking.
Id.
154 One commentator warns that if a party thinks the FDA could prevail against a pro-
cedural challenge to denial of an evidentiary hearing, choosing an alternative forum may be
best because the FDA has been fairly successful in denying formal hearings. Yet when the
FDA is on shaky ground and fears litigation over a denial, it may be willing to accept an
alternative proceeding as a compromise. Hoffman, supra note 139, at 334. When an adver-
sary has suspect data the wisest move would be to insist on a formal proceeding because
board procedures limit your ability to expose weaknesses in an adversary's case. Id. at 335.
If the party thinks he needs the expertise of independent scientists he may want to choose
the advisory committee option since the board is ad hoc and may lack "regulatory perspec-
tive that comes with experience... "'Id. at 337. Another consideration is that it may be easier
to persuade a majority of an advisory committee than a majority of a board which has only
three members. On the other hand, "membership of a public board of inquiry can be tailored
precisely to fit the requirements of the case it is to hear." Id.
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mind, most parties are likely to demand a formal hearing, leaving the board
unused. The FDA will benefit from the board mechanism only if the board's
procedures are attractive to parties. The procedures suggested above
should help implement the goals of the FDA in establishing the board by
making the board more attractive to potential parties.
Selection of the Board
Other possible reasons for the difference between the decisions of the
board and the commissioner are that the board members did not have the
required expertise or that they were biased. The positions the members
held at respected universities seem to negate the conclusion that the
members did not possess the expertise." However, it is possible in the pres-
ent board procedure to select biased members.
The FDA's board selection process was designed to avoid having biased
viewpoints on the board. The FDA thought that having each nominating
group submit a list of five persons would provide the agency with enough
choices to avoid selecting members who represent one party's view." The
FDA's view is defective in two ways. First, it ignores an advocate's ten-
dency to build support for the position it will advance.' Second, the selec-
tion process does not ensure equal representation on the board for all in-
terested groups.158 Either the petitioner or the bureau responsible for the
matter before the board always faces the possibility of not getting a member
on the board because only one member is selected from their combined
lists."9 In addition, this process does not assure that the best opposing view-
point will be represented on the board, since there may be many intervenors
whose interests are not similar.'
By allowing parties to help select members, the FDA attempted to in-
crease participation in the decisionmaking process. In practice, however,
the procedure creates a selection process open to controversy, and places
potential partisans in positions that should be neutral. A possible solution
is to have an independent body such as the National Academy of Sciences
15 See supra note 75.
5 Greenberger, A Consumer Advocate's View of the FDA's Procedures and Practices, 32
FOOD DRUG CoSM. L.J. 293, 297 (1977).
"' Lakoff, supra note 115, at 377; Greenberger, supra note 156, at 297:
Certainly, it can be expected that any individual chosen would exercise his
or her independent judgment, and would not feel bound in a formal sense to
"represent" the interests of the nominating party. However, nominating parties
will certainly be aware of the approaches taken by individuals. It often would
not be difficult to find five people whose approach, although arrived at in-
dependently, would be completely compatible with the nominating party. The
whole notion of nominations from different sources obviously implies an expec-
tation of different viewpoints.
15 Thompson, supra note 31, at 314.
159 Id.
16O Id.
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select board members. The Academy has experience in selecting members
for government advisory groups.""' Academy selection of members would
lessen charges that the board members represent one viewpoint or that
the FDA commissioner was biased in selection." Charges could still be made
that the NAS was biased in selection,163 but the process would be no worse
than for many other government committees.
Result Orientation
As previously noted, questions that cannot be resolved by science often
must be resolved by the law." When there is such a question, and modes
of analysis lead to different answers, underlying values determine how a
decisionmaker decides. 6' In the aspartame case underlying values and
pressures could have influenced the decisions of the board and commis-
sioner. The commissioner has pressures that a board does not. For instance,
Searle was threatening to pursue a lawsuit against the FDA in order to
generate a final decision. 66 Societal pressures also may have influenced the
commissioner more than the board because the board was partially in-
sulated by virtue of its temporary nature. Important societal pressure in-
volved in the aspartame decision included the previous year's decision not
to allow cyclamate back on the market, and the potential ban on saccharin
in the summer of 1981.167 Thus, aspartame disapproval could have left dieters
and diabetics without a sugar substitute.1 6 8 These pressures may help ex-
"' See Carpenter, Legislative Approaches: The Regulation of Chemicals in 1 CONSUMER
HEALTH AND PRODUCT HAZARDSICOSMETICS AND DRUGS, PESTICIDES, FOOD ADDITIVES 1, 33, 36,
37 (S. Epstein & R. Grundy eds. 1974).
,' But cf. WESSEL. supra note 114, at 146-47 (footnote omitted):
The National Academy of Sciences and its membership are seen as strictly
"establishment," controlled and composed very largely of scientists who have
"achieved" in major ways within the present "repressive" economic and social
system, dependent upon government and industry for funding and other sup-
port, and certainly not reflective of the views of other less "well-fixed" opinion
in the scientific world. Whether or not any of this is true is really almost irrele-
vant. The perception itself means that the general community does not always
accord the status of true scientific "consensus" to the conclusion of a scientific
panel studying a controversial issue. For all these reasons, the "scientific ad-
visory committee" approach-valuable as it clearly is-is not enough.
'3 See Turner, Principles of Food Additive Regulation in 2 CONSUMER HEALTH AND PRODUCT
HAZARDSICOSMETICS AND DRUGS. PESTICIDES,FooD ADDITIVES 289,305-06 (S. Epstein & R. Grundy
eds. 1974) (Turner notes blatant industry influence on the NAS and FASEB (the parent
organization of UAREP)).
l See supra notes 108-10 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 118-20 and accompanying text.
l Wall St. J., July 16, 1981, at 2, col. 2.
Cyclamate (Cyclamic Acid, Calcium Cyclamate, and Sodium Cyclamate) Commissioner's
Decision, 45 Fed. Reg. 61,474 (1980).
l" In the summer of 1981 Congress extended oversight prohibition on a saccharin ban un-
til the summer of 1983. Saccharin Study and Labeling Act Amendment of 1981, Pub. L. No.
97-42, 95 Stat. 946 (1981). This spring Congress once again extended the prohibition for an
additional 24 months. Saccharin Study and Labeling Act Amendment of 1983, Pub. L. No.
98-22, 97 Stat. 173 (1983).
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plain discrepancies in the decisions of the board and the commissioner.
Another explanation for the discrepancies in the aspartame decision is
that the commissioner and the board held differing scientific philosophies
which influenced the standards they used to make their decisions. The board
"emphasized" that it had only three studies on which to base its decision
on carcinogenicity and decided that more studies were needed;"9 the com-
missioner admitted more studies would have been helpful, but thought he
could make a decision based upon available studies.7 The board thought
that the number of rats in the carcinogenicity studies was too low; 7 ' the
commissioner stated that the number was shown to meet agency
standards. 2
Differences in regulatory philosophies also can influence decisions. In the
cyclamate decision, a former commissioner noted that methodologies
employed in animal studies "must" be considered in deciding how much
weight to give a study,7 1 while in the aspartame decision both the commis-
sioner and the board disallowed a request to question the manner in which
studies were conducted because they thought they could rely on the
UAREP authentication. From the language of the decision, it is unclear
whether the authentication included an investigation into the conduct of
the studies. Authentication seems to have centered on determining whether
the studies were fraudulent and not on the manner in which they were
conducted. 5 While the commissioner described this dispute as a "seman-
tic" difference on the meaning of the term "scientific validity,"'76 the dif-
ference may have determined the outcome of the aspartame decision.
As the aspartame decision illustrates, many factors can determine how
an issue is analyzed. For purposes of the law, however, results should be
oriented toward the statutory mandate of the agency, not toward personal
or political philosophies or pressuresY.7 For the FDA the mandate is
safety.76
Standard of Review
The FDA's standard of safety in its regulations presents an anomaly dif-
ficult to justify in the aspartame decision. Section 409(c)(3)(A) of the Federal
Food and Drug Act permits the FDA to approve a food additive only if
109 Initial Decision, supra note 8, at 38,346, 38,34849.
... FDA Approval, supra note 72, at 987.
. Initial Decision, supra note 8, at 38,348.
' Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,762-63; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,300.
1 45 Fed. Reg. 61,478 (1980).
"' Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,764-66; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,301-02; Initial Decision, supra
note 8, at 38,337.
175 Final Decision, supra note 8, at 38,764-66; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,301-02.
Id. at 38,765; 46 Fed. Reg. 38,301.
177 McGarity, supra note 18, at 782.
178 See infra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
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the petitioner proves that the product will be safe. 179 FDA regulations pro-
vide that food additive is safe if "there is a reasonable certainty in the minds
of competent scientists that the substance is not harmful under the intended
conditions of use."'" This language seems to prevent the commissioner from
overturning a board's determination that it is not certain of the product's
safety, as long as that uncertainty is "reasonable" and the board members
are "competent scientists." However, in the aspartame case the board's
decision was deemed to be "initial," thereby allowing the commissioner to
review the record and make his own determinations.18' By its actions in
the aspartame decision the FDA suggested that it will defer to outside ad-
visory committees and public boards only as long as they support the
bureau's position."= However, if an expert advisory group, such as the board,
is only given lip service, then utilization of the board becomes merely a
wasteful step in a repetitious process of regulation."
The anomaly presented above suggests that a standard of review which
is consistent with the competence of the board and designed to improve
its credibility should be set for a commissioner's review of a board deci-
sion. One way to accomplish this goal, while also confining the decision-
making of the board and commissioner to their respective areas of
expertise,' is to separate fact and policy issues to the extent possible,'85
giving the board only the fact questions. The factual determinations of the
board should then have a presumption of validity'8 with a clear error stan-
dard of review. Policy determinations should be left to the commissioner,
to be made within constraints mandated by the FDA organic statute.' Sec-
tion 409(c)(5)(a-c) mandates consideration of probable consumption,
cumulative effect in the diet, and safety factors, and allows consideration
179 21 U.S.C. 348(c)(3)(A) (1976).
- 21 C.F.R. 170.3(i) (1983).8 44 Fed. Reg. 31,716, 31,718 (1979).
18 One commentator has noted a similar problem in regard to formal hearings: "Since the
FDA has usually taken a position on the board policy questions before the hearing, the agency
tends to view the formal hearing merely as a device for creating a record that will support
previously determined administrative decisions." Hamilton, supra note 2, at 1154.
1I Cf. FDA DRUG PROCESS, supra note 1, at 68 ("In this country, advisory committees, for
the most part, are only given lip service, and the FDA makes the final decision itself.").
"I See supra notes 121-26 and accompanying text.
81Id.
1 Whether a decision by a scientific decisionmaking body should be binding on regulatory
agencies is debatable. The National Science Panel suggested by AIHC, see supra note 117,
would not make a panel's determinations legally binding, but agencies would be expected
to accept panel determinations "as the basis for planning any subsequent regulatory action."
Id. at 281. Representative Wampler's version of the panel would make findings binding on
the regulatory agency. Id. at 10 (statement of Rep. Wampler). A former administrative lawjudge has suggested that the hearing process could be improved by requiring that facts deter-
mined by administrative law judges be deemed final if supported by substantial evidence.
Thus "full and automatic de novo review as to questions of fact," would end. Gladstone, The
Administrative Process in Administrative Law, 31 AD. L. REv. 237, 243 (1979).
'I The FDA's organic statute is the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. S
301-92 (1976).
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of other factors when regulating food additives under the general safety
clause." Thus, as suggested by one commentator regarding the regulation
of carcinogens, the commissioner might consider "logistic, economic,
hedonistic, esthetic, ethical, and other cultural values.18 9
The aspartame case illustrates other problems in the existing board pro-
cess which may have contributed to the differences in the decisions of the
board and the commissioner. Moreover, a clear error standard would have
yielded the same results in the aspartame decision, assuming the commis-
sioner's evaluation of the data was correct.190 Strengthening the board's
factual determinations while leaving policy issues to the commissioner's
determination would add credibility to the board and eliminate repetition
in the regulatory process.
. CONCLUSION
The Food and Drug Administration must resolve difficult scientific and
technological questions while administering its regulations. When FDA
hearings became burdensome during the 1960s the need for a more effi-
cient process was perceived and the public board of inquiry was im-
plemented as one alternative to a formal hearing. Implementation of the
board was meant to achieve better quality decisions on scientific matters,
and to improve efficiency, through innovative procedures aimed at conduct-
ing board hearings as scientific inquiry, rather than as legal trials.
The first board was used in 1980 to consider safety questions concern-
ing the sugar substitute aspartame. The aspartame decision reveals the
difficulty of regulatory decisionmaking when scientific questions are in-
volved. Scientific uncertainty is approached differently by science and the
law, and makes decisionmaking difficult because information may be in-
complete or inappropriate.
Although final resolution of scientific disagreement faced by the FDA
may be impossible, the public board of inquiry is a promising procedure.
The procedure has kept hearing length short, narrowed issues, provided
a record for review, brought outside expertise into the decision, forced the
commissioner to explain his position, and provided a forum for interested
parties to express their views. Yet, in light of the aspartame decision the
board procedure needs some changes. The FDA's concern with efficiency
needs to be balanced with the need for adversarial procedures in order to
achieve fairness for parties. Selection of board members also needs to be
modified to prevent biased views from being represented on the board. The
18 Id. S 348(c)(5)(a)-(c).
' See Gori, The Regulation of Carcinogenic Hazards, 208 ScI. 256, 260 (1980) (Gori would
set definitions and rankings for consideration of these factors in regulation).
190 See supra notes 94-100 and accompanying text.
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board's role should be limited to making factual determinations. The board
should decide the extent of uncertainty on a matter, and board determina-
tions should then be reviewed only on the basis of a clear error standard.
These reforms would aid the public board of inquiry in making a positive
contribution to the regulatory process.
TODD R. SMYTH

